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Abstract. Recent results suggest that quantum mechanical phenomena
may be interpreted as a failure of standard probability theory and may be
described by a Bayesian complex probability theory.
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There is more to probability theory than proving theorems in a partic-
ular mathematical system. One is also in a position to make predictions
about real physical systems by adding extra assumptions to the standard
axioms. Such predictions are necessarily subject to experimental test, and,
to the extent that one believes in the extra assumptions, such tests may
be interpreted as testing the correctness of probability theory itself. Now
this may already seem like an odd point of view, especially here, since this
conference series itself provides a most impressive record of success for prob-
ability theory in a vast array of situations with no indication of a problem
– so why is there any reason to doubt probability theory? Here I think that
there is a historical effect: probability theory may actually be failing all the
time, it’s just that the situations where a failure occurs are called “quantum
mechanical phenomena” and thus appear in physics conferences instead of
in probability theory conferences. This suggests that perhaps there is some-
thing wrong with probability theory after all, and that this may be where
quantum mechanical effects come from. Let’s adopt this point of view and
see where it leads [1, 2, 3].
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An obvious place to test our new point of view is the two–slit exper-
iment where, as everyone knows, the fact that an interference pattern is
observed even if one particle is sent through at a time, forces us to con-
clude that it is not true that a particular particle either goes through slit
#1 or through slit #2; in general, then, a particle cannot be said to fol-
low a path through space. This is the “wave–particle duality,” the basic
effect in quantum mechanics. Notice, however, that from our new point of
view, the standard argument has a hole in it due to it’s essential reliance
on probability theory. For a position x on the screen where there is a dip
in the interference pattern, one reaches a contradiction by noticing that
P(x) = P(x via slit#1) + P(x via slit#2) ≥ P(x via slit#1) (1)
means that opening the second slit should not cause the probability to arrive
at x to decrease. But if we are willing to modify probability theory, then
the standard argument and it’s surprising conclusions do not necessarily
follow. In fact it is clear that in order to escape the standard conclusions, a
modified probability theory must provide a way for probabilities to cancel
each other and so an obvious first guess is to allow probabilities to be
complex numbers. Here, of course, the argument grinds to a halt for a
frequentist since frequencies are not the complex numbers. However, as
Bayesians, we are not completely out of options because for us, probabilities
start out only as (real and non–negative) measurements of “likelihood”
where the frequency meaning for this likelihood is derived after the fact.
Similarly, we might consider a complex “likelihood” and see if a frequency
meaning can be found for this as well. In fact, the simplest thing to do is to
take Cox’s assumptions[4] and just drop the restriction that probabilities be
real and non–negative. In this case, it turns out that Cox’s entire argument
follows as before and one ends up with “complex probability theory” having
the same form as the probability theory that you’re used to except that
probabilities are complex. For any propositions a, b and c,
(a→ b ∧ c) = (a→ b)(a ∧ b→ c) (I.a)
(a→ b) + (a→ ¬b) = 1 (I.b)
(a→ false) = 0 (I.c)
where I have written the complex probability that proposition b is true
given that proposition a is known as “(a→ b)” (to be read: “a goes to b”)
reserving the more familiar notation P (b|a) for standard [0, 1] probabilities.
Given our complex probability theory we would like to continue in par-
allel with the Bayesian development and construct a frequency meaning for
complex probabilities. Recall that for standard probability, this works by
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supposing that the probability of something is p and considering N copies
of that situation with f = n/N successes. Using the central limit theorem
f is asymptotically gaussian with mean p. Then, since the probability for
f to be in any interval not containing p can be made arbitrarily small by
increasing N , this fixes the frequency meaning for p. Essentially, the fre-
quency meaning of p rests on the extra assumption that an arbitrarily small
probability for f to be in some interval means that f in fact will never be
observed to be in that interval in a real experiment. The situation is not
quite so simple in complex probability theory because a zero complex prob-
ability does not in general mean that the corresponding event will never
happen. However, we can proceed by assuming that this extra condition is
true for a special set of propositions U called the “state space.” Let’s also
assume that this U satisfies the following for x, y ∈ U , propositions a, b,
time t ≤ t′ ≤ t′′:
xt ∧ yt = false if x 6= y (II.a)
(at → bt′′) = (at → Ut′ ∧ bt′′) (II.b)
(at ∧ xt′ → bt′′) = (xt′ → bt′′) (II.c)
where subscripts denote time, as in “at” meaning “a is true at time t,” and
where a set of propositions with a subscript denotes the or of each element
with the same subscript, as in Ut = ∨x∈Uxt. These are just Markovian style
axioms intuitively corresponding to “the system has a state.” Roughly, the
system cannot be in two different states at the same time (II.a), the system
is in some state at each intermediate time (II.b) and the knowledge that
a system is at some point in the state space makes all previous knowledge
irrelevant (II.c). We assume that U is a measure space with (at → Ut′) =∫
x∈U (at → xt′). Note the clash of terminology where the Hilbert space of
standard quantum mechanics is sometimes also called the “state space.”
Here U is only a measure space of propositions.
Given I and II, one can repeat the standard argument for the expression
Prob(at, bt′) =
∫
x∈U |at → bt′ ∧ xt′ |
2∫
x∈U |at → xt′ |
2
which predicts the frequency that b is found to be true at time t′ given that a
is known at a previous time t. Although Prob as defined is able to predict the
frequencies for outcomes of any experiment, it fails to extend to propositions
involving mixed times (e.g. bt′ ∧ ct′′ , t
′′ > t′). This is an interesting point
because it is exactly this failure that allows complex probability theory to
escape Bell’s theorem[3]. Also, although I don’t have a sharp result, it is
seems likely that this effect disappears in a classical limit, thus explaining
why standard probability theory works in the classical domain.
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Immediate consequences of axioms I.a–I.c and II.a–II.c include facts
familiar from probability theory such as (a→ true) = 1, (a→ b∨c) = (a→
b)+(a→ c)−(a→ b∧c), and if (a→ b) 6= 0, then (a∧b→ c) = (a→ c)(a∧
c → b)/(a → b) (Bayes Theorem). Following standard probability theory,
propositions a and b are said to be independent if (q ∧ a → b) = (q → b)
for all q and, just as in standard probability theory, “locality” enters via
assumptions of independence. For instance, if experiments e1 and e2 have
possible results r1 and r2 respectively, then the assumptions that {r1, r2},
{e1, r2}, and {e2, r1} are independent imply
(e1 ∧ e2 → r1 ∧ r2) = (e1 → r1)(e2 → r2)
as one would expect from, for example, two experiments which have noth-
ing to do with each other. Other simple consequences of the axioms are
described in references 1-4 including
− The Path Integral
− The Superposition Principle
− The Expansion Postulate
− The Schro¨dinger/Klein–Gordon Equations for U = Rd
where the standard wavefunction Ψ(x, t) is proportional to the complex
probability
(Everything that you know about the system→ xt)
making the Bayesian status of the wavefunction obvious. In particular, the
same system may be described by different wavefunctions depending upon
what is known and such wavefunctions can clearly not be “the state of the
system” in any reasonable sense.
To get a feeling for how things work, let’s consider a typical interfer-
ometer as shown in figure 1. Particles enter the device one at a time, pass
through a beam splitter, hit one of two mirrors and pass through a second
beam splitter ending up either in detector D1 or in D2. Although it looks
perfectly possible for a particle to end up in D2, experimentally we mys-
teriously find that this never happens. All the particles register in D1. In
standard quantum theory, one describes this situation by saying that there
are two paths for a particle to go from the source to D2. The amplitude for
these paths have opposite signs and since the probability is the square of
the total amplitude, this explains why particles never enter D2. Now let’s
consider a modified situation (figure 2) where a device is attached to one of
the mirrors which is able to detect if the mirror was struck by the particle.
After each particle passes through, the device either indicates “hit” or “no
hit.” Experimentally, we find that the results are now different with about
half of the particles ending up in detector D2. How can we explain this?
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Figure 1. A simple interferometer where a particle enters as indicated and encounters
a beam splitter (S1), a mirror (M1 or M2), a second beam splitter (S2) ending up either
in detector D1 or in detector D2.
In standard quantum mechanics there are still two paths for a particle to
reach D2 as before. However, since we can now tell which path was taken
by the particle by inspecting the hit/no–hit device, the amplitudes for the
two paths no longer interfere. This is a special case of the general principle:
− Paths interfere only if there is no way of knowing which path was taken,
even in principle.
This is a rather mysterious statement since it suggests that whether or
not you can deduce which path was taken somehow affects the behavior
of the particle. Also, it is not clear what “even in principle” means here
or what happens if, for example, the hit/no–hit device works with, say,
99% efficiency. Even so, the basic prediction of this principle is correct
and this raises the question of whether there is an analogous principle in
complex probability theory and whether the predictions are the same. You
can indeed easily deduce from the axioms and the definition of Prob that
− Paths interfere if and only if they end at the same point in U.
6 SAUL YOUSSEF
D 1
D2
nohit
S
SM
M
1
2
1
2
hit
Figure 2. A interferometer similar to the one shown in figure 1. The device is attached
to the mirror M1 records whether M1 was struck by the particle or not.
and this appears to give the same predictions as the more mysterious sound-
ing standard quantum mechanical principle. For instance, within complex
probability theory, the situation of figure 1 could be described by a state
space R3 (assuming that the particle is spinless) in which case the complex
probability to arrive at D2 is the sum of the complex probabilities for two
paths, which also cancel, just as in standard quantum mechanics. In the
situation shown in figure 2, one simply notes that the state space R3 is ev-
idently no longer sufficient to describe the system. If one extends the state
space to, say, U = R3 × {hit, nohit}, then the interference is lost because
the two paths for reaching D2 now end at different points in U . There is
also a continuum between this result, where the hit/no–hit device is as-
sumed to work perfectly, and a situation where the device works so badly
that the propositions “hit” and “no–hit” are independent of which path the
particle is taking. In this case, you can easily show that the original effect
is restored[2].
Of course, standard quantum mechanics is perfectly capable of handling
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a situation like that of figure 2. It’s just that a rigorous treatment of the
problem with a Hilbert space including the hit/no–hit device where the
state vector evolves under the action of a Hamiltonian would be rather
difficult, especially considering the simplicity of the answer. This helps to
explain the popularity of “which path” style arguments in spite of their
ambiguity. Here complex probability theory has the advantage that simple
assumptions about a system can rigorously be encorporated without having
to decide what the assumptions mean in terms, for example, of solutions to
the Schro¨dinger equation. A rigorous treatment of these problems within
quantum mechanics would also have to address the issue of whether the
initial state is “mixed” or not since not all situations in quantum mechanics
can be described by a vector in a Hilbert space, some require “statistical
mixtures” of vectors in a Hilbert space. This provides an interesting test
for complex probability theory. Since ordinary “statistical mixtures” are
no longer available to us, situations requiring “mixed states” had better
be handled within the existing axioms. These situations appear to indeed
be handled quite smoothly and naturally within the complex probability
theory described here[2].
To take an example with more detailed predictions, consider a sin-
gle scalar particle with U = Rd and consider a sequence of propositions
xo, x1, . . . , xn in U = R
d where each xj implicitly has a time subscript tj
with tj+1−tj = τ > 0. As always, (xo → xn) is given by the “path integral”
(xo → xn) =
∫
x1
. . .
∫
xn−1
(xo → x1)(x1 → x2) . . . (xn−1 → xn).
Of course, there is a path integral in standard quantum mechanics as well[5]
where one proceeds to dynamics by assuming that the amplitude for a path
is proportional to eiA where the “action” A is the time integral of a classical
Lagrangian for the system. Here we can avoid these extra assumptions by
repeating the same argument within each τ sized interval making n sub–
path integrals (figure 3) with time step ǫ = τ/N . By letting both τ and
ǫ go to zero, one can extract a central–limit–theorem–like result where for
small |z| and small τ , (xt → (x+ z)t+τ ) is given by
1
(2πτ)
d
2
√
det[ν]
exp(−τ [
1
2
(
zj
τ
− νj)Wjk(
zk
τ
− νk) + ν0])
where νo(x), νj(x), νjk(x) and Wjk(x) are moments of µ(x, z, τ) ≡ (xt →
(x+ z)t+τ ) defined by
ν0(x) =
∫
z∈U µτ (x, z, 0)
νj(x) =
∫
z∈U µτ (x, z, 0)zj
νjk(x) =
∫
z∈U µτ (x, z, 0)zjzk
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Figure 3. For x0, xn ∈ U , the complex probability (x0 → xn) is equal to a “path
integral” over x1, x2, . . . , xn−1 with time step τ . The argument can be repeated making
n sub–path integrals with time step ǫ.
with Wjk = MjlM
T
lkωl where M is the matrix which diagonalizes νjk such
that MTlj νjkMkm = δlm/ωl. With velocity vj given by the limit of zj/τ , the
above propagator is equivalent to the Lagrangian
L(x, v) =
i
2
(vj − νj)Wjk(vk − νk)− iν0
where we recognize νj(x) and νo(x) as the electromagnetic fields and where
Wjk(x) contains the particle mass and space–time metric. Notice that we
have not assumed Lorentz or gauge invariance to get this result. The claim
is that this is the only Lagrangian consistent with the state space Rd.
Since our complex probability theory is both “realistic” in the sense of
assuming that a particle does come through one slit or the other in the
two slit experiment (II.b) and local in the sense of accepting locality as-
sumptions as assumptions of “complex statistical independence,” you might
think that we would run afoul of Bell’s theorem or other more recent lim-
itations on local realistic theories. As I’ve already mentioned, Bell’s result
does not follow in complex probability theory. This means that although
Bell’s result has almost universally been interpreted as ruling out local
realistic theories, from our more general point of view, it forces a choice
between local realism and standard probability theory. In fact, Bell’s result
can be interpreted as another little hint that there is something wrong with
probability theory. Besides Bell, there are a large number of more recent
limitations on local realistic theories, each of which provides a test of the
complex probability formulation. Details are available only for three rep-
QUANTUM MECHANICS AS AN EXOTIC PROBABILITY THEORY 9
resentative results of this type (including Bell) where complex probability
theory appears not to be excluded[3].
You might expect that if quantum mechanical phenomena can be de-
scribed by complex probability theory, the Bayesian view might help in
understanding some of the long standing semi–paradoxical measurement
and observer questions in quantum mechanics. Here, it’s helpful to first
think about a purely classical experiment where a single coin is flipped and
then uncovered, revealing that it landed “heads.” From the Bayesian point
of view, of course, the situation before the observation could be described by
the distribution (1/2, 1/2) and after observing heads our description would
be adjusted to (1, 0). The problem is, what would you say to a student who
then asks:
− Yes, but what causes (1/2, 1/2) to evolve into (1, 0)? How does it hap-
pen?
Here we recognize a victim of a severe form of “Mind Projection Fallacy”[6]
where the person asking this question has confused what they know about
the system with the system itself. With the Bayesian view of complex prob-
abilities, it is clear that this same mistake is possible in quantum mechanics
as well, where one would now be mistaking a wavefunction for the state of
the system. This very view, however, is the standard picture of quantum
mechanics and so it is hardly surprising that similar mysteries arise. This
view is also implicit in questions such as
− Can the wavefunction be measured?
− What is the source of the non–local effects in EPR?
− Can macroscopic superpositions be created?
− Is the Universe in a pure state?
Although these are active research questions, it seems inescapable to me
that if quantum phenomena are correctly described by a Bayesian proba-
bility theory, then all of these questions have trivial answers and they all
ultimately fall into the same category as the student’s question about coin
flipping experiments.
For this audience, I hardly need to point out that the ideas that we have
discussed here may not only clarify the meaning of quantum mechanics, but
may also lead to ways of improving quantum mechanical calculations using
prior knowledge in the same sense that prior knowledge is used to improve
probability calculations in Bayesian Inference.
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